Tuesday, January 31, 2017
Iran injecting uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into IR-8 centrifuge machines violation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA)?
Iran injecting uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into IR-8 centrifuge machines violation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA)? (Taz).
US President Donald Trump is angry at the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA/ nuclear deal) because, after clinching the accord, the world has recognized Iran's right to enrich uranium, President Hassan Rouhani said.
President Rouhani said that it became feasible to enrich uranium in the country using advanced domestically-manufactured centrifuge machines,
known as IR-8, one year after the implementation of the JCPOA, Tasnim news agency reported.
The president made the remarks addressing a group of people in the northern province of Alborz.
The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) on Jan. 28 announced that the organization has started injecting uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into IR-8 centrifuge machines.
The organization through a statement on the same day said that Iran’s research and development plans will continue without any halt in all sectors of peaceful nuclear activities according to the JCPOA.
Iran and the world powers inked the JCPOA on July 14, 2015 .
Under the terms of the agreement as issued in a fact sheet released by the US State Department last year, Iran “will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.” Source.
Related: Technical Note: Making Sense out of the IR-8 Centrifuge By David Albright.
Currently, Iran has pledged not to inject the IR - 8 centrifuge with uranium hexafluoride since to do so would violate the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) (and if undeclared, also its safeguards agreement).
The IAEA reported in its most recent Iran safeguards report that no uranium hexafluoride gas had been injected into this centrifuge at the Natanz enrichment plant as of late August. 3
Although the IAEA recently visited one of Iran’s centrifuge R&D facilities, gaining more knowledge of Iran’s activities, and no evidence has emerged of secret enrichment in the IR - 8 or other centrifuges, the IAEA cannot determine, with the current safeguards and JPA verification arrangements, if Iran has secretly injected gas into the IR - 8 centrifuge at sites other than the Natanz or Fordow centrifuge plants.
The recent visit to the centrifuge R&D center did not constitute an inspection. For example, the IAEA did not take samples able to determine the presence of enriched uranium at the site. However, even with these uncertainties in mind, as of today, there is no reason to assume that Iran has tested the IR - 8 centrifuge with uranium hexafluoride.