Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Iran could work towards plutonium bomb.HT: QuotenQueen.(GoogleTranslate).For years, the concern is focused on the international experts in Iran legally operated openly enriching uranium to a weapons-usable amount. Forgotten, however, was apparently a well-known since the 70's effect, which is assessed with the help of a civil nuclear reactor Bushehr now used shortly after its commissioning by the mullahs' regime.
If these fuel as required by the contract for the remainder of regular life in the reactor, and then returned to the supplier in Russia, but are removed prematurely, can be gained from it considerable quantities of plutonium. This is exactly what has happened now - has the technical means for separation of plutonium, Iran expressed concern for years. That way, the Shiite regime that believes in the return of the Mahdi once destroyed the Jews and the world was thrown into chaos, are just about the production of plutonium bombs in large numbers. Which politician fool could have predicted that the religious maniacs in Tehran would not stick to the agreement? Die WELT reported :
Understandably, reported the daily press, especially about changes in enrichment capacity in the underground Fordow plant. The real urgency of the report is in two movements, however under "Miscellaneous".
Then, Iran, the IAEA in a letter dated 15 October informed that from the 22nd October would be out of the light-water reactor at Bushehr fuel removed and placed in a cooling pond. The IAEA has, the report says, as early as 6 and 7 Checked November this occasion the Bushehr reactor and certify that the fuel in the spent fuel pools actually was there.
For each of these non-specialist seemingly harmless situation has it all. It can arise technical needs - what in Bushehr was ever the case, and would be no problem. It may also be the introduction to the production of weapons-grade plutonium. That would mean a dramatic expansion and acceleration of Iran's nuclear armament, the western approach to the negotiations with Iran had failed so initially.
The meantime become known justifications of Iran for this approach, however, offers more cause for concern than for reassurance. When the Iranian representative to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the transfer of spent fuel as a "normal industrial process" the transfer of responsibility in Bushehr from Russia called on Iran, this is hardly credible.
The IAEA to see the activities in Bushehr as a serious problem, not only shows the absolutely unusual immediate review of the reactor, the critical comments of many diplomats based in Vienna also speak a clear language. Finally, it is not surprising that the IAEA has a secret report on the current operations in Bushehr exhibited goods.
The concerns of the IAEA and nuclear experts arising from the possible - not necessarily probable - "worst case", which could be associated with the removal of fuel.
Light water reactors were considered to be unsuitable for the spread of fissile material, the majority of relevant experts, however, caution in assessing this type of reactor has become. For it can be used not only just for energy, but also allows to produce by a "not normal" operation to a considerable quantity of weapons-grade plutonium.
Is a light water reactor, which is operated with low enriched uranium (four percent), set to the maximum power generation, the fuel remains in the reactor up to 60 months. However, the fuel takes just a few months, the final product is only slightly contaminated plutonium 239 - weapons-grade plutonium.
A rather random event has not adduced the practice test. In the 70s a British company had shut down a reactor prematurely. The result:. Around 450 kilograms of plutonium with a contamination level of only five to ten percent: material for about 70 bombs.
For Iran, this results in an option, the quantitative dimension is not entirely clear because the data on the operation of Bushehr are confusing. If the fuel was removed after twelve to 15 months of operation, the plutonium would have to be dry cleaned and then converted to metal.
For the chemical separation and the conversion of three to four months would be sufficient. In the said battery life stood Iran 300 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium available, enough for 40 to 50 bombs. If the fuel has before their removal only spent about eight months in the reactor, it would be 150 kg for about 25 warheads.
Iran so it should have actually apart on the production of plutonium, it stood after a cooling phase and after chemical separation and conversion of 150 to 300 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium disposal.
Given such nightmare scenarios, BelTA learned from the Foreign Ministry, Iran was held to "keep complete transparency prevail and the concerns of the internation
al community in relation to evacuate the civilian use of its nuclear program in the world." Iran expert Oliver Thränert, head of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, sees the present negotiation strategy with Iran questioned.
So far had the negotiators - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany - seen in Bushehr no proliferation problem. "In its proposals to Iran they have therefore agreed to provide in the event of an Iranian surrender to the dangerous uranium enrichment to support the construction of more light-water reactors are available," said Thränert the "world".
Consequently, also the Iranian people to show that it is not about Iran off from a civilian usable technology. "But if it does not succeed in Iran to explain the early removal of fuel rods convincing, this should correct itself policy be reconsidered urgently," said Thränert.
Given that in the past came to light thinking capacities of the responsible politicians can assume that the "rethinking of policy" as long as lasts until Iran provides the world with a fait accompli.Read the full story here.